

provided she is attended. It is extremely unlikely, then, that Nausicaa could, in 6.286–8, be referring to an absolute prohibition on the presence of unmarried girls among men without their parents' permission.¹⁰ Where parental permission is required is in the forming of attachments leading to marriage; this is what the gossip of the citizens suggests Nausicaa has done, and it is to this that her use of the verb *μίσσηται* refers. Outwardly, at least,¹¹ it is not her own behaviour which Nausicaa recognizes as improper or which she describes as 'mixing with men', but that which is conjured up as a pejorative construction placed on her own conduct by the churlish elements in the polis.

To show that Nausicaa's *νέμεσις* is not directed at behaviour which could be compared with her own it is sufficient that her own behaviour should be innocent, and that this is so is suggested by the context of guest-friendship and by Alcinous' remarks; accordingly, it may be argued, I do not need a pejorative sense of *μίσσηται* to prove my case. By the same token, however, if the behaviour which Nausicaa criticizes is not her own, there is no need for a neutral sense of *μίσσηται*, and if 'mixing with men' is to paraphrase the taunts of the citizens and contrast with 'open marriage', a neutral sense, I submit, is impossible.¹²

Nausicaa's expression of her principles thus makes perfect sense; rather than enunciating principles which she is actively engaged in flouting, she is explaining to Odysseus exactly why the criticisms of the churlish elements, unjustified as they are, matter to her. The use of the *καὶ δ' ἄλλω* ... formula in this passage therefore does not detract from, but reinforces the importance of the locution as an indication of Homeric man's awareness that he possesses standards of his own.

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¹⁰ On the sense of line 287 and the difficulty in construing the genitives see Hainsworth, *ad loc.*

¹¹ The meeting between Nausicaa and Odysseus is very subtly handled, and, in particular, our knowledge of N.'s readiness for marriage is consistently exploited to colour our interpretation; it is possible that N. is so sensitive to criticism of her having found a husband from elsewhere precisely because she hopes to do just that; thus she may feel rather more vulnerable to criticism than might a girl with no thought of marriage in her mind. This does not entail, however, that N. should regard herself as guilty of 'mixing with men' in the manner which she would criticize in others, and any hidden anxieties she may feel do not affect the logic of her explicit remarks.

¹² Rieu's (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1946 etc.) 'consorts with' is on the right lines.

PARMENIDES' REFERENCE

First in the aether Parmenides places the morning star, which he believes to be the same as the evening star ...¹

[the moon] always looking towards the sunshine²

I shall not be concerned with the truth or falsity of these ascriptions, only with the fact that they are just the sort of thing that Parmenides could have said. Nor is an

¹ Diels-Kranz A40a (Aëtius 2.15.4 [*Dox. Gr.* 345]) tr. Gallop. See Diogenes Laertius 8.14 (Diels-Kranz A40a also), where the same discovery is said to have been attributed by Parmenides to Pythagoras (but for two opinions, see Diels-Kranz A1, Diogenes Laertius 9.21–3).

² Diels-Kranz B15. See also Diels-Kranz A42 for direct statements that, according to Parmenides, the moon gets its light from the sun.

interest in Parmenidean reference new in the literature: Furth calls him a 'hyperdenotationist',³ and the word is apt on almost any interpretation.

The unity of morning and evening stars (one thing under two descriptions) has become a familiar example in abstract philosophical discussion. Here, however, I shall be concerned with this unity as a concrete feature of Parmenides' sketch of mortal opinions. It is a commonplace that opposites (e.g. fire and night, B8.56–9) predominate in the opinions of mortals, but what we learn from the morning and evening stars is that these opposites can be judged to be one. And this is the same judgement made about contrary names in the section on truth, B8.38–41:

Wherefore it has been named all things that mortals have established, persuaded that they were true: 'to come to be' and 'to perish'; 'to be' and 'not at all'; 'change of place' and 'exchange of bright colour'.⁴

(Note how all of these are properties of the morning and evening stars as we see – or do not see – them.) But the real object behind all the contrary names is just Being. The names are not true of Being, but they point to Being; for Heraclitus, I suppose (B67 DK), they would all have been true. Thus the report on the morning and evening stars is an example – even within the opinion section – of Parmenides' view of the behaviour of two contrary terms in relation to the third thing they name. It would also follow from this that the contrary terms whose specification as fire and night begins the opinion section (B8.53–4) name Being, but inadequately, so that they merely point to Being without describing it fully or properly.

The moon, receiving light from the sun, is its contrary, but is also one with it because of the sharing of the sunlight. Thus this example, along with the morning and evening stars, shows how mortal thinking bifurcates unities into contraries.

One is accustomed to thinking of Parmenidean Being as beyond all opposites. These fragments fill in a corner of the story. The opposites have different meanings, but both inadequately point to Being even though these meanings exile them from the possession of full reality.⁵

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³ See Montgomery Furth, 'Elements of Eleatic Ontology', *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 7 (1968), 111–32, reprinted in A. P. D. Mourelatos, ed., *The Pre-Socratics: A Collection of Critical Essays* (Garden City, 1974), pp. 241–70.

⁴ These lines have been interpreted several ways (see David Gallop, *Parmenides of Elea: Fragments* [Toronto, 1984], pp. 70–1). Here I follow Woodbury and others in reading τῶ πάντ' ὀνόμασται, which draws a connection between mortal contraries and reality without relegating the former to the status of being mere names. I follow Gallop in adopting Burnyeat's translation in 38–9. The quoted translation of the sentence as a whole is from my *Parmenides: Being, Bounds, and Logic* (New Haven, 1986), p. 165.

⁵ I thank Texas A&M University for research support; A. P. D. Mourelatos for first drawing my attention to these fragments; and the Editors for some further valuable suggestions.

THE LAKONIAN KEY

'I can make nothing', declared Paul Cartledge in this journal some years ago, 'of the "Lakonian key" first attested in Aristophanes (*Thesm.* 423)'.¹ (For other attestations see Aristophon, *Peirithous*, fr. 7 Kassel–Austin; Menander, *Misoumenos*, fr. 8 Sandbach (10 Koerte); Plautus, *Mostellaria* 404–5, cf. 419–26.)

¹ P. A. Cartledge, 'Spartan Wives: Liberation or Licence?', *CQ* 31 (1981), 84–105, at 102 n. 109.